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NEW DIRECTIONS IN PROTEST POLICING 
EDWARD R. MAGUIRE* 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 9, 2014, a white police officer in Ferguson, Missouri shot and 
killed an unarmed 18-year-old African-American man named Michael Brown.1 
While the details of the shooting are disputed, for many black residents in the 
area, the incident represented the culmination of a long line of abusive police 
practices targeted primarily toward African Americans.2 The controversial 
shooting triggered months of mass demonstrations in the St. Louis area.3 The 
protests intensified on November 24, 2014 when the grand jury decided not to 
indict the officer.4 The way area police departments responded to the protests 
was viewed by critics as heavy-handed and overly militarized.5 An after-action 
assessment sponsored by the Justice Department’s Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services (COPS) concluded that police relied on “ineffective 
and inappropriate strategies and tactics” that had the “unintended consequence 
of escalating rather than diminishing tensions.”6 
 
* Edward R. Maguire is a Professor in the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Arizona 
State University. Thank you to the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services for funding a 
portion of the research on which this article is based, and to Belén Lowrey for her assistance in 
preparing the manuscript. 
 1. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 29, n.17 (Mar. 4, 2015) [hereinafter FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
INVESTIGATION]. 
 2. See id. at 4. 
 3. Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare after Ferguson Police Officer is Not 
Indicted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-darren-
wilson-shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html?_r=0; Ferguson Unrest: From Shooting to 
Nationwide Protests, BBC (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30193 
354. 
 4. Davey & Bosman, supra note 3. 
 5. Pete Williams, DOJ Report Faults Police Response to Ferguson Protest, NBC NEWS 
(June 30, 2015, 1:36 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/doj-report-faults-police-re 
sponse-ferguson-protest-n384561. 
 6. INST. FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED 
POLICING SERVICES, U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AFTER-ACTION ASSESSMENT OF THE POLICE 
RESPONSE TO THE AUGUST 2014 DEMONSTRATIONS IN FERGUSON, MISSOURI xiv (2015). 
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The Ferguson protests spread nationally, helping to launch what COPS 
Director Ronald Davis called “a new civil rights movement” in the U.S.7 The 
police response to the Ferguson protests led, in part, to President Barack 
Obama’s decision to establish the President’s Task Force on 21st Century 
Policing in December 2014, the first presidentially appointed blue ribbon panel 
to examine policing practices in the U.S. in nearly 50 years.8 When the Task 
Force released its report to the president in May 2015, it called for an overhaul 
in the way American police agencies handle protests and mass 
demonstrations.9 
This article examines protest policing practices in the U.S. and offers 
suggestions for improving how police prepare for and respond to protests and 
mass demonstrations. Part I of the article examines the police response to the 
protests that occurred in and around Ferguson, Missouri after the killing of 
Michael Brown. I focus in particular on the various civil rights violations 
committed by police officers against protesters and journalists. Part II 
establishes a broader historical context for thinking about how protest policing 
has evolved in the U.S. over the past fifty years. The police response to the 
protests in and around Ferguson did not occur in a vacuum; it was consistent 
with an unfortunate trajectory in the recent evolution of protest policing in the 
U.S. Part III provides a brief overview of two bodies of social science research 
– one on the psychology of compliance and defiance, and the other on crowd 
psychology – with direct implications for improving protest policing strategies. 
Part IV draws on this research evidence in outlining a new vision for protest 
policing in the U.S. 
I.  THE PROTESTS IN AND AROUND FERGUSON, MISSOURI 
Shortly after the shooting of Michael Brown at 12:02 p.m. on Saturday, 
August 9, 2014, an “increasingly hostile” crowd gathered near the homicide 
scene on Canfield Drive in Ferguson, Missouri.10 Within two hours, police at 
the scene issued a mutual aid request to assist with crowd control; officers 
from 29 agencies responded.11 The crowd was incensed that Brown’s body 
remained lying face down in the middle of the road for four hours while 
investigators processed the scene.12 Residents and police reported hearing 
 
 7. See id. at ix. 
 8. WASHINGTON, DC COPS OFFICE, PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY 
POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 1 
(2015), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf. 
 9. See id. 
 10. INST. FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 6, at 6. 
 11. INST. FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 6, at 9. 
 12. Julie Bosman & Joseph Goldstein, Timeline for a Body: 4 Hours in the Middle of a 
Ferguson Street, N.Y. TIMES (August 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/24/us/ 
michael-brown-a-bodys-timeline-4-hours-on-a-ferguson-street.html. 
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multiple gunshots in the area. As the crowd continued to grow and become 
more hostile toward police, tactical officers wearing riot gear arrived on the 
scene.13 After police finished processing the homicide scene, protests 
continued into the evening in various locations around Ferguson, including 
across the street from the Ferguson Police Department.14 
The next day, demonstrators assembled in multiple locations in and around 
Ferguson. Police estimated that the total size of the crowds reached about 
1,000 people, some of whom were described as behaving in a confrontational 
and aggressive manner toward police.15 Protesters began to block streets, 
disrupt traffic, and throw objects at police officers and police vehicles.16 
Further requests for mutual aid were issued, and police reinforcements from 
multiple agencies continued to arrive.17 That evening, demonstrators looted 
more than 30 area businesses and burned down a convenience store.18 The 
after action assessment notes that “in their attempt to gain control of the 
situation, several agencies deployed armored vehicles and canines.”19 
Protesters ignored police orders to disperse, and as a result police deployed 
smoke canisters to disperse the crowds. When the smoke proved ineffective, 
police deployed CS gas.20 The crowds began to dissipate, though some 
protesters and looters remained active until after 3:00 a.m.21 
By August 11th, two days after the shooting, a pattern began to emerge in 
which demonstrations held during the daytime were mostly peaceful.22 By 
evening, however, portions of the crowd began to behave in a more disorderly 
manner, engaging in vandalism and looting, and in some cases firing guns.23 
According to the after-action assessment: “that night, the group of protesters 
 
 13. See id.; see also INST. FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 6, at 10. 
 14. INST. FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 6, at 11. 
 15. INST. FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 6, at 11 
 16. INST. FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 6, at 12. 
 17. INST. FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 6, at 12–13. 
 18. INST. FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 6, at 15. 
 19. INST. FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 6, at 12. 
 20. INSTITUTE FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 6, at 14–15. CS gas is a 
type of tear gas used by police primarily for riot control. Exposure to CS gas causes burning and 
irritation of the eyes, nose, mouth and throat. It is intended to temporarily incapacitate those who 
are exposed to it and to encourage compliance with police requests to disperse. Elspeth 
Worthington & Patrick A. Nee, CS Exposure - Clinical Effects and Management, 16 J. ACCID. 
EMERG. MED. 168 (1999); Leo J. Schep, Robin J. Slaughter, & David Ian McBride, Riot Control 
Agents: The Tear Gases CN, CS and OC - A Medical Review, 161 J. ROYAL ARMY. MED. CORPS 
94 (2015). 
 21. INSTITUTE FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 6, at 15. 
 22. INSTITUTE FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 6, at 17. 
 23. See INSTITUTE FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 6, at 17; see also Joe 
Lamie, Crisis in Ferguson: More Businesses Looted Overnight, FOX2NOW (August 16, 2014, 
3:44 AM), http://fox2now.com/2014/08/16/crisis-in-ferguson/. 
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became even larger than previous nights. Police reported that demonstrators 
were throwing rocks, bottles, frozen bottles of water, Molotov cocktails, and 
other objects.24 The mass gatherings became more vocal and aggressive with 
burning of businesses and other property damage, including looting and 
breaking windows.25 Law enforcement responded with the use of armored 
vehicles, tear gas, PepperBall projectiles, bean bag rounds, and Stingerballs to 
disperse the crowds.”26 
As the daily protests continued, the St. Louis County Police and other area 
police agencies came under intense criticism for their use of aggressive, 
militaristic tactics to control the protests.27 Sam Dotson, Chief of the St. Louis 
Metropolitan Police Department, chose not to send tactical resources to assist 
in the protest response because he disagreed with the tactics being used.28 On 
August 14th, President Barack Obama weighed in, first condemning protesters 
who engaged in criminal behavior, and then noting that there is “no excuse for 
police to use excessive force against peaceful protests or to throw protesters in 
jail for lawfully exercising their First Amendment rights.”29 
The heavy-handed police response to protests in and around Ferguson 
resulted in several civil rights lawsuits.30 For example, six protesters alleged 
that three area police agencies (St. Louis Metropolitan Police, St. Louis County 
Police, and the Missouri State Highway Patrol) used indiscriminate force 
against them while they were engaged in constitutionally protected behavior 
under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. According to the 
plaintiffs, they were 
“…subjected to actions by police acting under authority of command now 
designated as the Unified Command, designed to frighten and intimidate 
plaintiffs and to deter their continued exercise of First Amendment rights. 
Officers acting under authority of Unified Command have intimidated 
demonstrators, impeded their entry or exit from demonstrations, assaulted 
them with chemical agents including tear gas and pepper spray, shot them with 
 
 24. INSTITUTE FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 6, at 16. 
 25. INSTITUTE FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 6, at 16. 
 26. INSTITUTE FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 6, at 16. 
 27. Howard Koplowitz, Ferguson Protests: Why do the Police Look Like the Military?, 
INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2014, 4:53 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/ferguson-protests-why-do-
police-look-military-1659098; Mark Thompson, Why Ferguson Looks So Much Like Iraq, TIME 
(Aug. 14, 2014), http://time.com/3111455/ferguson-missouri-michael-brown-iraq. 
 28. Jeremy Kohler, St. Louis Police Chief Says He Does Not Support Militarized Tactics in 
Ferguson, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/ 
crime-and-courts/st-louis-police-chief-says-he-does-not-support-militarized/article_b401feba-
b49e-5b79-8926-19481191726f.html. 
 29. Zeke J. Miller, Obama: ‘No Excuse’ for Ferguson Violence, TIME (Aug. 14, 2014), 
http://time.com/3111730/barack-obama-ferguson-michael-brown/. 
 30. Templeton, et al. v. Dotson, et al., U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Missouri, 
Eastern Division, Case No. 4:14-CV-2019, Complaint (December 8, 2014). 
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so-called ‘less than lethal’ projectiles, rounded them up in mass arrests, 
engaged in physical and verbal abuse, failed to visibly identify themselves, and 
categorically labeled demonstrations as unlawful assemblies.”31 
In December 2014, a federal judge issued a temporary restraining order against 
the three police agencies named in the lawsuit.32 Her decision noted that police 
had done a poor job of distinguishing between peaceful protesters and 
criminals.33 She concluded that “people involved in peaceful, nonviolent 
political speech can do that without being lumped in with the criminals.”34 In 
March 2015, the parties settled the lawsuit.35 In the settlement agreement, the 
three agencies agreed to refrain from using chemical agents to disperse people 
not engaged in criminal activity unless they first issue “clear and unambiguous 
warnings” that chemical agents will be used,” provide people with the 
opportunity to “heed the warnings and exit the area,” adopt reasonable 
measures to minimize the impact of chemical agents on people who are 
complying with lawful police commands, and provide people with a safe 
means of exiting the area.36 The agreement also specified that police cannot 
use chemical agents on people who are not engaged in criminal activity “for 
the purpose of frightening them or punishing them for exercising their 
constitutional rights.”37 
The police were also accused of interfering with the work of professional 
journalists covering the demonstrations.38 From August to November of 2014, 
24 journalists were arrested in the Ferguson area.39 Audio and video recordings 
of police officers threatening or using force against journalists quickly went 
 
 31. Id. at 2. 
 32. Joel Currier, Judge Orders St. Louis Area Police to Give Protesters Tear Gas Warning 
and Time to Flee, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/ 
local/crime-and-courts/judge-orders-st-louis-area-police-to-give-protesters-tear/article_d93628c7-
cc4e-5dfa-9873-cd4baf59ad73.html. 
 33. See id. 
 34. Currier, supra note 32. 
 35. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Settlement as to All Defendants at 1, Templeton, et al. v. 
Dotson, et al., No. 4:14-CV-2019 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2015). 
 36. Id. at 2 
 37. Id. 
 38. Abby Phillip, Police in Ferguson Arrest and Threaten More Journalists, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 18, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/08/18/police-in-
ferguson-arrest-and-threaten-more-journalists/; Jennifer S. Mann, St. Louis County Police Agree 
to Court Settlements with 2 Journalists Arrested in Ferguson, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 
3, 2015) http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/st-louis-county-police-agree-to-
court-settlements-with-journalists/article_54147eba-0dbf-5bed-9915-5251f7aae3b5.html. 
 39. Runa A. Sandvik, Documenting the Arrests of Journalists in Ferguson, FREEDOM OF 
THE PRESS FOUND. (Nov. 26, 2014), https://freedom.press/blog/2014/08/documenting-arrests-jour 
nalists-ferguson. 
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viral.40 In August 2014, attorneys representing three area police departments 
(Ferguson Police Department, St. Louis County Police Department, and the 
Missouri State Highway Patrol) signed an agreement in federal court with a 
journalist who had filed a civil rights lawsuit against them.41 The agreement 
stipulated: 
“Parties acknowledge and agree that the media and members of the public have 
a right to record public events without abridgement unless it obstructs the 
activity or threatens the safety of others, or physically interferes with the 
ability of law enforcement officers to perform their duties.”42 
As the protests continued, the plaintiff in this case alleged that police were 
violating the agreement and continuing to obstruct the freedom of the press.43 
As a result, on November 21, 2014, a federal judge issued preliminary 
injunctions permanently enjoining (prohibiting) each agency from “interfering 
with individuals who are photographing or recording at public places but who 
are not threatening the safety of others or physically interfering with the ability 
of law enforcement to perform their duties.”44 
In March 2015, four professional journalists filed a federal civil rights 
lawsuit alleging that the St. Louis County Police Department and 20 of its 
officers violated their constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments with the intention of “obstructing, chilling, deterring, 
and retaliating against” them for doing their jobs.45 That lawsuit is not yet 
resolved.46 
 
 40. Phillip, supra note 38; Sasha Goldstein, Suburban St. Louis cop suspended for 
threatening to kill, pointing gun at media in Ferguson, Mo., N.Y. DAILY NEWS (August 20, 2014, 
8:54 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/st-louis-area-suspended-threatening-kill-
media-ferguson-article-1.1911046. 
 41. Agreement at 1, Hussein v. County of St. Louis, et al., No. 4:14-CV-1410-JAR (8th Cir. 
Aug. 15, 2014). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Amended Complaint at 1, Hussein v. County of St. Louis et al., No. 4:14-CV-1410-JAR 
(8th Cir. Nov. 12, 2014). 
 44. Order by Consent at 1, Hussein v. County of St. Louis, et al., No. 4:14-CV-1410-JAR 
(8th Cir. Nov. 21, 2014). Note that the quote comes from the injunctions issued against St. Louis 
County and the Missouri State Highway Patrol. The injunction issued against the Ferguson Police 
Department contained the same essential message but was more explicit, prohibiting the agency 
and those within its control from enforcing or threatening to enforce: “any rule, policy, or practice 
that grants law enforcement officers the authority or discretion to arrest, threaten to arrest, or 
interfere with any individual, including any member of the media or member of the public 
photographing or recording in public places unless that person is threatening the safety of others 
or physically interfering with the ability of law enforcement to perform their duties.” 
 45. Complaint at 2, Devereaux, et al. v. County of St. Louis, et al., No. 2:15-cv-00023 (8th 
Cir. Mar. 30, 2015). 
 46. Id. 
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A. The Grand Jury Decision and Its Aftermath 
On November 24, 2014, St. Louis County prosecutor Robert McCulloch 
announced that the grand jury had decided not to indict the officer in the 
Ferguson shooting.47 The announcement triggered a new wave of intense 
looting and rioting in Ferguson.48 Rioters threw rocks and bottles at police, 
torched one police car and damaged several others, fired gunshots in the air, 
and set fire to more than a dozen buildings.49 The protests quickly spread 
across the nation, fueled in part by the grand jury’s decision and in part by two 
other well-known cases.50 
In July 2014, an unarmed African American man named Eric Garner died 
after being taken to the ground in Staten Island by a white New York City 
police officer attempting to arrest him for selling loose cigarettes.51 On 
November 22, 2014, a white police officer in Cleveland shot and killed a 12-
year old African American named Tamir Rice who was holding a toy gun.52 
On December 3rd, a grand jury in New York City decided not to charge the 
NYPD officer for Garner’s death, further intensifying the growing national 
protest movement.53 The nationwide protests over these shootings helped fuel 
the rapid growth of the “Black Lives Matter” movement which was established 
in 2012 after the death of Trayvon Martin.54 
In response to these issues, President Barack Obama signed an Executive 
Order on December 18, 2014, establishing the President’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing.55 The Task Force was charged with identifying “the best 
means to provide an effective partnership between law enforcement and local 
 
 47. A later investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice reached a similar conclusion. 
CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT 
REGARDING THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN 
BY FERGUSON, MISSOURI POLICE OFFICER DARREN WILSON 5 (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.jus 
tice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/doj_report_on_shooting 
_of_michael_brown_1.pdf; Jeremy Kohler, Statement of St. Louis Prosecuting Attorney Robert P. 
McCulloch, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/ 
crime-and-courts/statement-of-st-louis-prosecuting-attorney-robert-p-mcculloch/article_2becfef3-
9b4b-5e1e-9043-f586f389ef91.html. 
 48. Jennifer Pompi, Inferno! Rioting, fires, looting, break out after decision announced, 
WASH. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/nov/24/rioting-
breaks-out-in-ferguson-after-grand-jury-cl/?page=all. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See infra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
 51. Ray Sanchez, Four Mothers Share Pain of Losing Sons, CNN (Dec. 12, 2014, 9:12 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/12/us/martin-rice-brown-garner-mothers/. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Sanchez, supra note 51. 
 54. Sanchez, supra note 51. 
 55. Exec. Order No. 13,684, 3 C.F.R. § 217 (2015). 
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communities that reduces crime and increases trust.”56 It had been nearly 50 
years since a U.S. president had appointed a blue ribbon panel to review 
American policing practices.57 The Task Force worked quickly, soliciting 
testimony from a variety of experts and other stakeholders from across the 
nation.58 In May 2015, the Task Force released its final report to the 
President.59 The report described the philosophical foundation of the Task 
Force as building trust between police and citizens “so that all components of a 
community are treating one another fairly and justly and are invested in 
maintaining public safety in an atmosphere of mutual respect.”60 Since the 
Task Force was established in part due to events in Ferguson, a part of its focus 
was on policing protests.61 
II.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF PROTEST POLICING IN THE UNITED STATES 
While the police response to the Ferguson protests shocked the conscience 
of many Americans, it was consistent with recent shifts in public order policing 
practices. The strategies and tactics used by police in the U.S. to deal with 
protests and other public order events have improved considerably in some 
agencies, but other agencies continue to embrace approaches that are both 
ineffective and unnecessarily aggressive. In this section, I provide a brief 
history of protest policing practices in the U.S., from the Civil Rights 
movement of the 1960s to the events following the shooting of Michael Brown 
in Ferguson, Missouri in 2014. 
Protests have played an important role in stimulating significant social 
change throughout U.S. history. President Dwight Eisenhower once said that 
Americans “are descended in blood and in spirit from revolutionaries and 
rebels -- men and women who dare to dissent from accepted doctrine...”62 Ever 
since the American colonists rebelled against oppressive British rule, protests 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. See PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 8, at 1. In 1965, 
President Lyndon Johnson established a commission to study crime and law enforcement in the 
United States. See PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (February 1967), https://www.ncjrs. 
gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf [hereinafter THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME]. 
 58. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 8, at 1. 
 59. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 8, at 1. 
 60. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 8, at 5. 
 61. See Part IV infra, for a review the Task Force’s recommendations for improving protest 
policing in the U.S. 
 62. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 34th President of the U.S., Address at the Columbia University 
National Bicentennial Dinner, New York City (May 31, 1954), (transcript available at The 
American Presidency Project), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9906 
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have helped forge the liberty on which the U.S. is founded.63 Although the 
right to protest is vital in a participatory democracy, governments at all levels 
have often sought to prevent, disrupt, and otherwise control protests.64 As 
agents of the government, the police have historically played a key role in 
managing and controlling protests.65 While a detailed treatment of the police 
handling of protests throughout American history is beyond the scope of this 
article, a brief review of the evolution of protest policing in the U.S. over the 
past fifty years is instructive for thinking about where we are today. 
According to social movement scholars, the dominant approach to protest 
policing in the 1960s and into the 1970s was the escalated force model.66 This 
approach was based on the idea that a dominant show of force by police will 
convince protesters to comply with their orders.67 Accordingly, police must 
continue to escalate the level of force until they achieve compliance.68 The 
escalated force model has five primary characteristics: a lack of appreciation or 
respect for protesters’ First Amendment rights; an intolerance for community 
disruption and a tendency for police to equate civil disobedience with anarchy; 
a minimal level of communication or negotiation between police and 
protesters; the widespread use of arrest, often under tenuous or legally 
questionable circumstances, as a means to control protesters; and an over-
reliance by police on the use of force.69 
The escalated force model is based on some questionable assumptions 
about the psychology of crowds and the people that comprise them.70 History 
has taught us that the premature or ill-advised use of force against protesters, 
particularly the use of riot control techniques, often amplifies conflict with 
protesters and can instigate violence.71 Moreover, the escalated force approach 
has played a central role in some of our nation’s darkest moments, including 
the police response to protesters in Alabama at the Birmingham civil rights 
campaign in May 1963 and the “Bloody Sunday” protests in Selma in March 
1965; the Orangeburg Massacre in February 1968 in South Carolina; the 
 
 63. Jean-Baptiste Velut, A Tale of Polarizations: Stress, Inertia and Social Change in the New 
Gilded Age, in DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION AND CONTESTATION: CIVIL SOCIETY, GOVERNANCE AND 
THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 107 (Emmanuelle Avril & Johann N. Neem eds., 2015). 
 64. See generally id. 
 65. See generally Velut, supra note 63. 
 66. Clark McPhail, David Schweingruber, & John McCarthy, Policing Protest in the United 
States: 1960-1995, in POLICING PROTEST: THE CONTROL OF MASS DEMONSTRATIONS IN 
WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 50 (Donatella della Porta & Herbert Reiter eds., 1998). 
 67. See id. 
 68. McPhail et al., supra note 66. 
 69. McPhail et al., supra note 66, at 51. 
 70. See David Schweingruber, Mob Sociology and Escalated Force: Sociology’s 
Contribution to Repressive Police Tactics, 41 THE SOC. QUARTERLY 3, 383–84 (2000). 
 71. McPhail et al., supra note 66, at 50. 
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Chicago Democratic National Convention in August 1968; and the campus 
demonstrations at Jackson State College in Mississippi in May 1970.72 These 
watershed events raised important questions about the legitimacy of the 
American police and the limits of freedom for people interested in expressing 
their views through public protest.73 
The heavy-handed police response to protests and other public order events 
in the U.S. during the 1960s and early 1970s was addressed by four separate 
presidential commissions.74 The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement 
and Administration of Justice, established in July 1965 by President Lyndon B. 
Johnson, concluded that most of the recent riots in the U.S. had been “touched 
off by commonplace street encounters between policemen and citizens.75 In 
short, the way any policeman exercises the personal discretion that is an 
inescapable part of his job can, and occasionally does, have an immediate 
bearing on the peace and safety of an entire community, or a long-range 
bearing on the work of all policemen everywhere.76 
Police must not react to disorder in the course of demonstrations too 
quickly or with too much force.”77 The Commission noted that the “tactics 
chosen at the beginning of disorder may well be the crucial factor in 
controlling a riot. The kinds and extent of police force employed, and 
equipment involved, must be thought out well in advance, taught to personnel 
through training and constantly reassessed.”78 The Commission acknowledged 
that preserving order and protecting the constitutional rights of protesters 
would be easier if “the leaders of protesting or demonstrating groups 
discussed, in advance with the police, the appropriate times and places for 
demonstrations and methods of demonstrating.”79 
The National Commission on Civil Disorders, commonly referred to as 
The Kerner Commission, was established in July 1967. The Kerner 
Commission concluded that in half of the 24 cities it studied, police actions 
immediately preceded the outbreak of violence.80 Much like the Department of 
Justice’s investigation of the Ferguson Police Department nearly 50 years 
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later81, the Commission noted that “the abrasive relationship between the 
police and the minority communities has been a major-and explosive-source of 
grievance, tension and disorder.”82 The Commission went on to note that the 
American police are regularly 
“…faced with demands for increased protection and service in the ghetto. Yet 
the aggressive patrol practices thought necessary to meet these demands 
themselves create tension and hostility. The resulting grievances have been 
further aggravated by the lack of effective mechanisms for handling 
complaints against the police. Special programs for bettering police-
community relations have been instituted, but these alone are not enough. 
Police administrators, with the guidance of public officials, and the support of 
the entire community, must take vigorous action to improve law enforcement 
and to decrease the potential for disorder.”83 
The Commission recommended that police develop specialized training to 
prevent civil disorders and control riots.84 
The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence 
(Eisenhower Commission), established in June 1968, found that “the police 
handling of protesters was often unrestrained and only increased the potential 
for violence — in the immediate situation and for the future.”85 The 
Commission’s Task Force on Violent Aspects of Protest and Confrontation 
echoed the findings from other commissions in noting that “the police used 
uncalled-for force, often vindictively, against protesters, often regardless of 
whether the latter were ‘peaceful’ or ‘provocative.’”86 The Task Force noted 
that a study of events at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago 
revealed 
“…unrestrained and indiscriminate police violence on many occasions, 
particularly at night…. That violence was made all the more shocking by the 
fact that it was often inflicted upon persons who had broken no law, disobeyed 
no order, made no threat. These included peaceful demonstrators, onlookers, 
and large numbers of residents who were simply passing through, or happened 
to live in, the areas where confrontations were occurring. Newsmen and 
photographers were singled out for assault and their equipment deliberately 
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damaged. Fundamental police training was ignored; and officers, when on the 
scene, were often unable to control their men.”87 
The report of the Commission’s Task Force concluded optimistically that 
while improper police action could escalate the level of violence, “swift and 
massive commitment of prudent and well trained law enforcement personnel 
can usually extinguish a civil disorder in its incipiency.”88 
The President’s Commission on Campus Unrest, commonly referred to as 
the Scranton Commission, was established in June 1970 after protesters were 
shot and killed by National Guardsmen at Kent State University in Ohio and by 
police at Jackson State College in Mississippi.89 The Commission’s report 
concluded that “there have been dangerous and sometimes fatal instances of 
unnecessary harshness and illegal violence by law enforcement officers.90 We 
therefore urged that peace officers be trained and equipped to deal with 
campus disorders firmly, justly, and humanely.91 They must avoid both 
uncontrolled and excessive response.”92 In the 1960s and early 1970s, the use 
of the term “police riot” became an increasingly popular shorthand for 
describing instances in which police instigated or escalated violent 
confrontations with crowds.93 
The failures of the escalated force model led to the emergence of the 
negotiated management model. Using this approach, police negotiate with 
protesters ahead of time to minimize conflict and reduce the need to use 
force.94 Under the negotiated management model, police respect and even help 
facilitate the First Amendment rights of protesters.95 The police have a greater 
level of tolerance for disruption, often communicating ahead of time what they 
will tolerate and what they won’t.96 Using the negotiated management style, 
the police recognize that communication with protesters is necessary to 
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achieve mutually agreeable outcomes.97 The police and protest groups may 
each appoint one or more liaisons to communicate on an ongoing basis to 
minimize the potential for misunderstandings.98 Finally, under the negotiated 
management style, the use of arrest and force as means of controlling 
protesters is minimized.99 Police may even make arrangements ahead of time 
to arrest those protesters who wish to be arrested as a sign of their commitment 
to the cause.100 These arrests are then executed in a peaceful manner and the 
arrest process is made simple for protesters.101 
The negotiated management model was successful in several ways. Social 
movement researchers believe that the spread of the negotiated management 
model in the late 1970s and into the 1980s dramatically reduced the frequency 
and intensity of conflict between police and protesters.102 The permitting 
process provided police and other officials with advance notice about planned 
protests, enabling them to prepare accordingly.103 This advance notice 
removed the element of surprise which, as pointed out by the President’s 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in 1967, had 
led to adverse outcomes in the past.104 The negotiated management model also 
stimulated communication between police and protesters, giving each side a 
human face, allowing both sides to state their wishes and expectations, and 
reducing the likelihood of miscommunications and misunderstandings.105 
More generally, the negotiated management process led to a softer style of 
policing protests.106 
According to social movement scholars, the negotiated management 
approach began to fade in the late 1990s as U.S. police began to adopt more 
aggressive and invasive approaches that have come to be known variously as 
the strategic incapacitation model, the command and control model, and the 
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Miami Model.107 In some ways these newer approaches resemble the escalated 
force model of the 1960s, though they each contain certain characteristics that 
set them apart from earlier approaches and from each other.108 One explanation 
for these shifts is that they resulted from the violent confrontations between 
police and protesters at the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial 
Conference in Seattle. During the WTO protests, demonstrators clashed with 
police, caused millions of dollars in property damage, and succeeded in 
disrupting the WTO meetings.109 Police made more than 600 arrests and 
deployed chemical agents (pepper spray and CS gas) and less lethal munitions 
(including beanbags and wooden, plastic, and foam baton rounds) against the 
crowd.110 
The governor of Washington declared a state of emergency and mobilized 
the National Guard to help restore order in the city.111 The chaos of the WTO 
protests came to be known as “the Battle in Seattle.”112 A committee 
established by Seattle’s City Council to review the episode concluded that: 
“[M]embers of the public, including demonstrators, were victims of ill-
conceived and sometimes pointless police actions to ‘clear the streets’… Our 
inquiry found troubling examples of seemingly gratuitous assaults on 
citizens… by officers who seemed motivated more by anger or fear than 
professional law enforcement.”113 
Additionally, Seattle Police Chief Norm Stamper, who resigned in the 
aftermath of the incident, later acknowledged that police (under his command) 
had over-reacted: 
“It was the worst mistake of my career. We used chemical agents, a 
euphemism for tear gas, against nonviolent and essentially nonthreatening 
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protesters. The natural consequence of which [is] that we were the catalyst for 
heightened tension and conflict rather than peacekeepers.”114 
Stamper concluded that the police response to protesters heightened 
tensions rather than de-escalating them, noting that “a whole lot of others 
would not have acted as they did if we didn’t act as we did.”115 After stepping 
down as Chief, Stamper went on to become a vocal critic of the excessive 
militarization of police agencies and the overly aggressive police response to 
protests and other public order events.116 
However, for some police leaders, the Seattle protests exposed the 
weaknesses of the negotiated management model, showing just how quickly 
and easily protests could get out of hand.117 They viewed the Seattle incident 
as “the kind of situation they needed to retrain and retool for so that it did not 
occur in their city, on their watch.”118 Just as the tragedy at Columbine High 
School became the pivotal event that reshaped the police response to active 
shooter situations, the Seattle WTO protests had a profound effect on the 
policing of protests in the U.S. and beyond.119 
The issues that arose in Seattle were also heavily influenced by the 
growing anti-globalization movement.120 Meetings of major international 
bodies (like the G-8, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the 
World Economic Forum, the World Trade Organization, and others) had begun 
to attract seasoned activists (often referred to by police as “professional 
protesters”) from all over the world. Radical activist groups had begun to reject 
the negotiated management model and the “choreographed demonstrations” 
that resulted from the permitting process.121 According to one social movement 
scholar, “activists complained that demonstrations orchestrated with the police 
were overly accommodating and ineffectual for promoting their goals.”122 
Radical activists “refused to use ‘contained’ or familiar and undisruptive 
tactics and instead engaged in ‘transgressive’ or innovative confrontational 
tactics…”123 The activists’ rebellion against negotiated management was 
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facilitated by the use of communication technologies.124 One scholar referred 
to the Seattle WTO protests as “the first wired mass demonstration.”125 
Organizers used the internet and email to plan and coordinate the protests.126 
Once the protests were already underway, mobile devices like cell phones and 
pagers were used to help organizers “move demonstrators, block streets, and 
coordinate protesters.”127 The use of these technologies in Seattle facilitated 
the emergence of more efficient “swarming” tactics in which protesters could 
outmaneuver police, mobilizing in a particular location very quickly and then 
dispersing just as quickly once police arrived.128 
Changes in the way police handle protests and other public order events 
were also influenced by the dramatic shifts that occurred in American policing 
after the terrorist attacks on American soil on September 11, 2001.129 The 
attacks came at a time when police departments in the U.S. were still 
modifying their approaches to public order events in response to the Seattle 
WTO protests.130 After 9/11, in addition to dealing with crime, disorder, 
traffic, and other mostly local issues, American police became a more integral 
part of the nation’s homeland security network. While counterterrorism had 
often been viewed as a federal responsibility, 9/11 served as a potent reminder 
that “responsibility for establishing the front line of defense in America’s cities 
and towns falls most heavily on state and local police.”131 
Intelligence units that had been dismantled or scaled back in the 1970s 
after the COINTELPRO scandal and other similar events were reactivated.132 
The U.S. military funneled surplus equipment, including armored vehicles and 
weaponry, to state and local police departments, igniting a debate over the 
militarization of American policing.133 Police officials began to wonder 
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whether the chaos and disorder surrounding protests and other public order 
events might attract terrorists intent on causing death and destruction.134 As the 
perceived threat level posed by these events increased, the police adjusted their 
approaches accordingly, reverting in some ways to the more aggressive 
approaches that predated the negotiated management era.135 
Social movement scholars have argued that since the 1999 Seattle WTO 
protests and the 2001 terrorist attacks, U.S. police agencies have shifted away 
from negotiated management and toward a newer approach called strategic 
incapacitation.136 This approach is characterized by a sense of disrespect for 
the exercise of First Amendment rights, an intolerance for community 
disruption, an unwillingness to communicate or negotiate with protesters, the 
use of arrests and force as primary methods for controlling protests, intensified 
efforts to control access to space, surveillance of protesters, and greater 
information sharing between law enforcement agencies.137 The spread of 
strategic incapacitation methods for dealing with protests has led to intense 
criticism of the police in some cities, with a particular focus in the U.S. on the 
constitutionality of these practices.138 
Other scholars divide these newer approaches to protest policing in the 
U.S. into two categories: the command and control model, and the Miami 
model.139 While both are considered substantially more aggressive and 
invasive than negotiated management, the command and control model is 
sometimes referred to as the “soft hat” approach, while the Miami model is 
referred to as the “hard hat” approach.140 The command and control model 
emphasizes “the micromanagement of all aspects of demonstrations” including 
the use of very restrictive permitting processes; intense efforts to control public 
space through the use of barricades, police lines, and other mechanisms to 
surround, subdivide, and direct the flow of protesters; and “a willingness to use 
force against even minor violations of the law.”141 The command and control 
model is based on the view that protests are inherently disorderly and must 
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therefore be tightly controlled to avoid more serious problems.142 It is 
consistent with the application of an order maintenance or “broken windows” 
style of policing to protests and other public order events.143 
The Miami model got its name from the response of the Miami area police 
to protests that occurred during the negotiations of the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) agreement in 2003.144 With police expecting trouble from 
anarchists, approximately 2,500 police officers in riot gear were deployed to 
the area from more than three dozen agencies.145 Police organized an 
overwhelming show of force and behaved aggressively toward protesters in 
their efforts to secure downtown Miami.146 Opinions differed about how well 
the police handled the protests, with Miami Mayor Manny Diaz characterizing 
the police response as “a model for homeland security,”147 and a circuit court 
judge who observed the protests referring to police actions as “a disgrace for 
the community.”148 An investigative panel convened by the City of Miami 
noted that officers were not prepared to handle “the intermingling of peaceful 
demonstrators with violent protesters” and recommended that the Miami Police 
Department train its officers on First Amendment rights.149 In the aftermath of 
the FTAA protests, the City of Miami and several other local governments 
agreed to legal settlements in excess of $1.5 million as result of alleged 
constitutional violations by police. 
The Miami model is characterized by an aggressive, militarized approach 
to protest control, including “the creation of no protest zones, heavy use of less 
lethal weaponry, surveillance of protest organizations, negative advance 
publicity by city officials of protest groups, preemptive arrests, preventive 
detentions, and extensive restrictions on protest timing and locations.”150 It is 
referred to as the “hard hat” approach because it involves deploying officers in 
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full riot gear.151 The Miami model tends to be used for more transgressive 
(confrontational, subversive, or destructive) protesters or groups that are 
viewed by police as unable to be controlled through negotiated management or 
command and control approaches.152 The Miami model relies on riot control 
techniques which are warranted under certain circumstances, such as rioting, 
looting, and violence.153 However, the use of these methods against peaceful 
protesters is unwarranted and has often resulted in costly civil settlements.154 
The newer approaches to protest policing discussed in this section – the 
strategic incapacitation model, the command and control model, and the Miami 
model – are more aggressive and invasive than the negotiated management 
model.155 For proponents, these new approaches are necessary to confront the 
violence and disorder associated with transgressive protesters who are 
unwilling to obey the law or cooperate with police in arranging mutually 
beneficial solutions.156 For critics, these new approaches represent a significant 
threat to free democratic expression and other foundational rights that are 
guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution.157 These newer approaches have also led 
to costly legal settlements with protesters, journalists, and innocent bystanders 
who allege that police violated their constitutional rights.158 
The shift toward more aggressive approaches became evident in several 
U.S. cities during the Occupy movement in 2012 and 2013.159 The Occupy 
movement has been called the “most significant social movement to utilize 
transgressive protest tactics in the U.S. in the last 40 years.”160 It emerged very 
suddenly, with Occupy protesters establishing encampments in parks and other 
public areas, often violating laws and regulations governing the use of these 
spaces.161 Protesters exercised their First Amendment rights loudly and often 
disruptively, routinely defying requests from police and local government 
officials to secure permits or follow pre-established routes during protest 
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marches.162 Occupiers openly challenged the authority of the police in many 
jurisdictions, engaging in mostly peaceful acts of civil disobedience.163 Police 
leaders struggled to address the many challenges posed by the Occupy 
movement, with some choosing to respond forcefully and decisively.164 As a 
result, images of “mass arrests, riot gear clad police, pepper spraying of 
demonstrators, and the use of tear gas and concussion grenades became 
commonplace in the U.S. in the fall of 2011.”165 Viral photos and videos 
showing police behaving abusively toward peaceful but noncompliant 
protesters generated substantial legitimacy costs for the American police.166 
Though some police agencies responded aggressively to the Occupy 
movement, others responded in a professional, thoughtful, empathetic, and 
creative manner to facilitate the First Amendment rights of Occupy protesters 
to assemble and express their views peacefully.167 In some cities, police 
continued to rely on negotiated management approaches, working together 
with protesters to find mutually agreeable solutions.168 In Salt Lake City, for 
example, police went to great lengths to preserve relationships and minimize 
conflict between police and protesters under the direction of Chief Chris 
Burbank.169 The Occupy movement arrived at a time when the most 
appropriate means of handling protests and other public order events was still 
contested.170 For some agencies, negotiated management had run its course 
and was eclipsed by newer approaches like strategic incapacitation, command 
and control, and/or the Miami model. Some had already tested out these new 
approaches and were forced to reconsider them when protesters prevailed in 
injunctions, lawsuits, and settlements against the police for violating their 
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constitutional rights. For others, negotiated management was still a viable 
approach under most conditions. 
After the death of Michael Brown in August 2014, police responded in an 
aggressive and militaristic manner to the intense protests that occurred in and 
around Ferguson. Once again the evening news featured police officers in riot 
gear, repeatedly deploying chemical agents and less lethal munitions at 
peaceful protesters and journalists. While many observers were surprised, the 
police response to the protests and civil unrest in Ferguson was consistent with 
recent shifts in public-order policing practices in the U.S. These shifts have 
proven costly for many cities. In January, 2014, New York City agreed to pay 
$18 million to settle dozens of lawsuits associated with wrongful arrests during 
protests outside the 2004 Republican National Convention.171 In 2012, the City 
of Chicago agreed to pay $12 million to settle lawsuits associated with the 
wrongful arrests of more than 900 protesters at a 2003 march against the war in 
Iraq.172 In 2010, Washington, DC agreed to pay $13.7 million to settle a class-
action lawsuit by people wrongfully arrested at a 2000 protest near the World 
Bank and the IMF.173 In 2009, the City of Los Angeles agreed to pay nearly 
$13 million to settle several lawsuits associated with the use of excessive force 
by police at a 2007 May Day rally.174 While some agencies have come a long 
way in developing more thoughtful and restrained public order policing 
strategies, others continue to rely on approaches that are reminiscent of those 
used during the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s. 
III.  LESSONS FROM RESEARCH 
This section outlines some basic concepts and principles from two bodies 
of social science research that provide a useful foundation for thinking about 
protest policing strategies. First, I examine theory and research on the 
psychology of compliance and defiance. Fair and effective protest policing 
strategies encourage people to comply voluntarily with police and the law. 
Unfair and ineffective protest policing strategies run the risk of instigating 
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defiance or rebellion, thus potentially worsening matters. Second, I examine 
theory and research on crowd psychology and its implications for public order 
policing. Developing fair and effective approaches to public order policing 
requires a clear understanding of how crowds function. Unfortunately, some of 
the strategies and tactics used commonly in policing protests are based on 
fundamental misconceptions about crowd psychology. As a result, these 
approaches often make things worse, not better. 
A. The Psychology of Compliance and Defiance 
A key challenge in policing protests and other public order events fairly 
and effectively is securing voluntary compliance with the law and its agents 
without triggering or amplifying people’s sense of defiance and rebellion. A 
long tradition of scientific research has examined why people choose to obey 
the law or follow the directives of legal authorities like the police. The findings 
from this research are instructive for thinking about how to police protests 
fairly and effectively. 
One of the most common explanations for why people obey the law and 
legal authorities is that the costs of not doing so usually outweigh the benefits. 
This is the basic premise behind deterrence theory, which posits that the 
certainty, severity, and swiftness of punishment influences people’s decisions 
to obey the law or legal authorities.175 Recently, criminologists have begun to 
embrace an alternative explanation for compliance that focuses instead on the 
extent to which people view the law and legal authorities as fair and legitimate. 
Two of the central concepts from this body of scholarship –procedural justice 
and legitimacy – were featured prominently in the recent report issued by the 
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing.176 
Procedural justice is concerned with how people perceive the fairness of 
the procedures used by an authority figure. It is typically viewed as having two 
components: the quality of treatment and the quality of decision making. In 
policing, the quality of treatment is concerned with the nature of the 
interpersonal interaction between a police officer and a citizen, such as 
whether the officer treated the citizen in a fair, polite, and respectful manner. 
The quality of decision-making is concerned with the fairness of the 
procedures used by an officer in making discretionary decisions such as 
whether to make a stop, conduct a search, issue a citation, make an arrest, or 
use force. During their encounters with police officers, citizens routinely make 
judgments about the quality of treatment and quality of decision-making 
exhibited by the officer. As I demonstrate shortly, these judgments have 
important consequences. 
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People’s judgments about the fairness of the outcomes they receive (such 
as a stop, search, citation, or arrest) are often separate from their judgments 
about the procedures used to reach those outcomes. Judgments about the 
fairness of outcomes are associated with distributive justice, while judgments 
about the fairness of processes and procedures are associated with procedural 
justice. Thus, people may be upset that they were arrested (a distributive 
justice judgment) while also viewing the behavior of the officer who made the 
arrest as fair and respectful (a procedural justice judgment). This distinction is 
especially important for police because it suggests that even when officers 
must deliver unfavorable outcomes like issuing a citation, making an arrest, or 
using force, they can still leave people with the perception that the officer 
behaved in a procedurally just manner. 
Procedural justice focuses specifically on judgments about the interaction 
between an authority figure and someone who is subject to that authority (such 
as a police officer and a citizen). Legitimacy, on the other hand, focuses on 
broader judgments about institutions such as the police, the law, or the 
government. Although the meaning of legitimacy is currently being debated by 
scholars, it is generally concerned with whether the authority exerted by an 
institution is rightful, proper, or appropriate.177 When the police are viewed as 
corrupt, brutal, or inept, citizens are unlikely to view them as legitimate 
sources of authority. In the U.S., several recent use of force incidents have led 
to a substantial legitimacy crisis in policing, particularly in minority 
communities. 
The importance of procedural justice and legitimacy hinges on the 
relationship between them. Research evidence suggests that people’s 
perceptions of procedural justice influence their judgments about the 
legitimacy of law and legal authorities.178 Thus, when people view the police 
as behaving in a procedurally just manner, they are more likely to view the 
police, and the criminal law more generally, as legitimate sources of authority. 
In such instances, they are more likely to comply with the law and its agents. 
This chain of relationships is referred to as the process-based model of 
regulation. It suggests that by behaving in a fair and respectful manner during 
interactions with citizens, police officers can enhance the perceived legitimacy 
of the police and the law. This, in turn, influences people’s decisions to obey 
the law and legal authorities. The inverse of this argument is also true. When 
police officers treat citizens in a manner that is perceived as procedurally 
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unjust, the police and the law are viewed as less legitimate, and people are less 
likely to comply. 
The process-based model of regulation serves as an alternative to 
deterrence theory, which suggests that people comply with the law and its 
agents to avoid punishment.179 The process-based model is appealing because 
it suggests that authority figures should treat people fairly, not only because it 
is the right thing to do, but because it works. This perspective emerges from a 
more general body of research which demonstrates that when people perceive 
the law or legal authorities as illegitimate, abusive, or unfair, they are more 
likely to rebel or become defiant.180 The process-based model has powerful 
implications for the policing of protests. When police attempt to exert control 
over protesters in a procedurally unjust manner, they can actually trigger a 
defiant or rebellious response in which protesters engage in even greater law-
breaking than if the police had not intervened at all. Thus, it is in the best 
interest of authority figures to behave in ways that preserve or enhance 
perceptions of legitimacy. 
A recent study of protesters reinforces these ideas. The study examined 
attitudes toward the use of violence against police among Occupy DC 
protesters. Findings from a survey of 136 Occupy DC participants revealed 
that some participants embraced the use of violence against police. More 
specifically, the study found that “31.5% of respondents find it reasonable to 
use minor forms of violence against police (pushing or shoving them), 16.9% 
find it reasonable to use moderate forms of violence (hitting or kicking them), 
and 10.9% find it reasonable to use severe forms of violence (throwing harmful 
objects or using a weapon against them).”181 
The study sought to determine why some protesters were more willing than 
others to use violence against police to accomplish their objectives. The 
findings revealed that the most important factor in explaining people’s 
willingness to use violence against police was their perception of the extent to 
which the police behave in a procedurally unjust manner. The effects of 
procedural justice were stronger than all other explanatory variables, including 
race. When protesters believe the police behave in a procedurally unjust 
manner, they are significantly more likely to support the use of violence 
against the police. Thus, in addition to the fact that procedurally just strategies 
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and tactics are likely to be more successful in encouraging law-abiding 
behavior, these approaches may also improve officer safety. 
B. Crowd Psychology 
Public order policing strategies and tactics are often based, either implicitly 
or explicitly, on theories of crowd behavior. Police officials who deal with 
crowds on a regular basis often have deeply felt theories about how crowds 
function. These theories inform their decisions about the most appropriate 
strategies and tactics for dealing with crowds. Unfortunately, some of these 
theories – and the strategies and tactics that flow from them – are based on 
antiquated perspectives in crowd psychology that have long been discredited. 
When police strategies and tactics are based on inaccurate assumptions about 
how crowds function, these approaches can stimulate more conflict than they 
prevent, endangering both crowds and the police. Thus, it is instructive to 
review some basic ideas from crowd psychology and their implications for 
policing protests and other public order events. 
The “classic perspective” on crowd psychology was articulated by Gustave 
Le Bon, a French scholar whose 1895 book, The Crowd: A Study of the 
Popular Mind,182 has been called “one of the most influential books” ever 
written in social psychology.183 Le Bon argued that crowds take on a life of 
their own, quite different from the individuals that comprise them. Moreover, 
individuals within a crowd begin to lose their individual identities and the 
capacity for individual decision-making as they become mesmerized by the 
magnetic and irresistible influence of the crowd. According to Le Bon, the 
characteristics and backgrounds of the individuals in a crowd do not really 
matter. All individuals in a crowd are subject to the contagious ideas of the 
larger crowd. LeBon states, 
“The most striking peculiarity presented by a psychological crowd is the 
following: Whoever be the individuals that compose it, however like or unlike 
be their mode of life, their occupations, their character, or their intelligence, 
the fact that they have been transformed into a crowd puts them in possession 
of a sort of collective mind which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner 
quite different from that in which each individual of them would feel, think, 
and act were he in a state of isolation.”184 
According to LeBon, although crowds are composed of people with different 
backgrounds, thoughts, and perspectives, crowds quickly become 
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homogeneous as a result of social contagion effects in which thoughts, 
feelings, and ideas diffuse throughout the crowd. Through this process, LeBon 
notes, an individual in a crowd “is no longer himself, but has become an 
automaton who has ceased to be guided by his will.”185 LeBon’s view of 
crowds is intensely pessimistic; he refers to them as barbarians and notes that 
they “are only powerful for destruction.”186 The classical view of crowds that 
he espouses treats them as unreasonable, unruly, and dangerous, thus providing 
an implicit justification for the use of repressive crowd control measures.187 
However, according to leading crowd psychology scholars, the classical view 
is “not only wrong, but dangerously wrong.”188 
The classical view of crowds, along with similar perspectives that emerged 
later, is premised on the idea that people in a crowd lose their individual 
identity and consequently lose control over their own behavior.189 An 
alternative perspective comes from social identity theory, which is based on 
the idea that people’s social identities are associated with the contexts in which 
they are embedded and the groups with which they associate. Social identity 
refers to “the way in which people understand how they are positioned relative 
to others.”190 People are typically associated with more than one social group 
and therefore have multiple social identities, each having its own level of depth 
and intensity.191 Moreover, people tend to be more heavily influenced by those 
with similar social identities than by those with whom they have little in 
common.192 Understanding the various social identities of people involved in 
protests and other public order events is crucial for developing fair and 
effective approaches for policing these events.193 
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The conventional view of social identities held that they have some level 
of permanence; they may not last forever, but they are also not fleeting.194 
Over time, this conventional view of social identities gave way to the 
elaborated social identity model (ESIM) which allows for the possibility of 
temporary shifts in people’s social identity as a result of the location or 
situation in which they find themselves.195 ESIM provides a powerful 
framework for understanding crowd psychology, and more specifically, crowd 
conflict.196 Crowds are heterogeneous and contain multiple subgroups, each 
with different norms and values.197 For example, most protests attract a wide 
range of participants from different walks of life.198 People belonging to these 
different subgroups may have different social identities and different 
behavioral norms.199 They don’t lose their identity in the ways outlined by 
LeBon, but they do take on different social identities when they become part of 
a crowd.200 A central aspect of the ESIM perspective is the notion that in 
crowds, people’s social identities can be heavily influenced by the behavior of 
outsiders, especially the police.201 
One way that crowd psychologists learn about crowd dynamics is by 
observing behavioral patterns at crowd events.202 Studies of different types of 
crowd events have discovered similar patterns: 
“Events would start with a heterogeneous crowd, the majority of which 
identified themselves as moderates who simply wanted to express their view to 
the authorities, and a minority of whom were radical and saw the authorities as 
an antagonist. However, crowd members were perceived as homogenously 
dangerous by the authorities (notably the police) and treated as such—that is 
denied the ability to express themselves as they wished. This then led to a 
radicalization among moderate crowd members who then joined with the 
radicals in challenging the police. Not only that, but they came to change their 
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views about the authorities and hence about their own identity in relation to the 
authorities.”203 
When police treat entire crowds as if they are dangerous and indiscriminately 
deny participants the opportunity to express themselves, the police may 
inadvertently lead moderate members of the crowd to align with more radical 
members against the police.204 Moderates enter protests and other types of 
crowd events with one sense of identity, and through their interactions with or 
observations of police, may take on a different social identity.205 This idea that 
police can inadvertently alter the social identities of people in crowds is central 
to the ESIM perspective.206 
According to crowd psychologists, one of the conditions responsible for 
generating conflict and violence in crowds is when there are discrepancies in 
the way events are viewed by insiders (crowd participants) and outsiders (such 
as the police).207 This occurs, for example, when protest participants view 
themselves as engaging in peaceful and constitutionally protected behavior and 
police view them as a threat to public order or public safety.208 Another 
condition that can trigger conflict is the tendency for police to view crowds as 
homogeneous and to adopt strategies and tactics “which impose a common fate 
on all crowd members.”209 This condition often becomes a self-fulfilling 
prophecy in which people thought to be disorderly and unruly become 
significantly more defiant and rebellious in response to shared perceptions 
about the way the police treat them.210 
One of the most important insights of the ESIM perspective is that ill-
advised actions by police can instigate or escalate conflict and violence in 
crowds.211 When crowd participants view themselves as engaging in lawful 
and constitutionally protected behavior, and they view the police as engaging 
in indiscriminate and illegitimate enforcement actions, then the whole crowd 
“will unite around a sense of opposition to the police and the authorities they 
are protecting.”212 They will experience an increased willingness to defy, rebel 
against, or use violence against the police.213 This is one of the key areas of 
overlap between crowd psychology and the notions of procedural justice and 
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legitimacy presented earlier.214 Furthermore, those who viewed themselves 
initially as moderates will come to reconsider their views of the police.215 
When the police treat moderate crowd members as radicals, the moderates 
begin to identify with the radicals to a much greater extent than they did 
before.216 Support for challenging or pushing back against the police can 
spread quickly under such conditions.217 However, this escalation process is 
not inevitable.218 Based on the principles of the ESIM perspective, police can 
develop thoughtful public order policing strategies that prevent and de-escalate 
conflict rather than inadvertently triggering or escalating it.219 
Most of the research on ESIM and its applications to policing has been 
carried out in Europe.220 The ESIM perspective serves as the foundation for 
recent reforms in policing protests and other public order events in several 
Western European nations.221 For example, after the tragic death of Ian 
Tomlinson at the hands of a police constable during the 2009 G-20 Summit in 
London, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of the Constabulary incorporated the 
principles of ESIM into its recommendations for reforming protest policing in 
England and Wales.222 Consider the following passage from the Inspectorate’s 
review: 
“Indiscriminate use of force by the police can create a sense of unity in the 
crowd through a common perception of the illegitimacy of police action and 
corresponding opposition in response. Perceptions of police legitimacy are 
critical because they affect the crowd’s internal dynamics, facilitating or 
undermining the ability of those seeking conflict to exert social influence over 
others in the crowd. Consequently, there is an increase in the numbers within 
the crowd who perceive conflict against the police as acceptable or legitimate 
behavior, thereby empowering those prepared to engage in physical 
confrontation with the police. In this way, the crowd is drawn into conflict 
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even though the vast majority had no prior intention of engaging in 
disorder.”223 
The review urged police in England and Wales to adopt a variety of strategies 
and tactics that would minimize the extent to which protesters would “transfer” 
their grievances toward the police.224 Police in several Western European 
nations have also incorporated the ESIM principles into their strategies for 
policing protests and other public order events.225 These approaches have been 
especially successful in reducing crowd violence at sporting events.226 
IV.  A NEW VISION FOR THE FUTURE OF PROTEST POLICING 
The shooting of Michael Brown and the police response to the protests in 
and around Ferguson following his death set in motion a new national 
discourse on police behavior in the U.S. Much of this conversation has focused 
on police abuse of authority, particularly with regard to the treatment of 
minorities.227 The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing was 
established in December 2014 to examine these issues in detail and to make 
recommendations for reform.228 The Task Force was charged with examining a 
wide range of policing issues, most of which are beyond the scope of this 
article. However, the Task Force issued one recommendation and two action 
items focused on police response to protests and mass demonstrations.229 I 
begin this section by reviewing the Task Force’s coverage of the police 
response to protests. I then outline a new vision for the future of protest 
policing in the U.S. that is consistent with the Task Force’s recommendations. 
The Task Force’s report to the president noted that protests and mass 
demonstrations “are occasions where evidence-based practices successfully 
applied can make the difference between a peaceful demonstration and a 
 
 223. HER MAJESTY’S INSPECTORATE OF CONSTABULARY, supra note 221, at 86. 
 224. HER MAJESTY’S INSPECTORATE OF CONSTABULARY, supra note 221. 
 225. HER MAJESTY’S INSPECTORATE OF CONSTABULARY, supra note 221, at 86. 
 226. See e.g., Council of the European Union, Concerning and Updated Cooperation and 
Measures to Prevent and Control Violence and Disturbances in Connection with Football 
Matches with an International Dimension, in Which at Least One Member State is Involved, 
OFFICIAL J. EUR. UNION (June 3, 2010), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri 
=CELEX:32010G0624(01)&rid=2; see also Clifford Stott, Otto Adang, Andrew Livingstone & 
Martina Schreiber, Variability in the Collective Behaviour of England Fans at Euro2004: 
‘Hooliganism’, Public Order Policing and Social Change, 37 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 75, 78–79 
(2007). 
 227. Conor Friedersdorf, Ferguson’s Conspiracy Against Black Citizens, THE ATLANTIC 
(Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/03/ferguson-as-a-criminal-con 
spiracy-against-its-black-residents-michael-brown-department-of-justice-report/386887/. 
 228. Press Release, The White House, President Obama Announces Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/18/presi 
dent-obama-announces-task-force-21st-century-policing. 
 229. INST. FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 6, at 88–89. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] NEW DIRECTIONS IN PROTEST POLICING 97 
riot.”230 This statement is reminiscent of the findings of several presidential 
commissions during the Civil Rights era (outlined in Part II) and the findings 
from social science research on compliance, defiance, and crowd behavior 
(outlined in Part III). In Recommendation 2.7, the Task Force urged police 
agencies to “create policies and procedures “…for policing mass 
demonstrations that employ a continuum of managed tactical resources that are 
designed to minimize the appearance of a military operation and avoid using 
provocative tactics and equipment that undermine civilian trust.”231 This 
recommendation included two “action items.”232 
The first action item called for police agencies to develop policies and 
procedures “for implementing a layered response to mass demonstrations that 
prioritize de-escalation and a guardian mindset.233 These policies could include 
plans to minimize confrontation by using ‘soft look’ uniforms, having officers 
remove riot gear as soon as practical, and maintaining open postures.”234 This 
suggestion is consistent with a larger movement in policing to recast the role of 
police as guardians rather than warriors.235 The Task Force quoted my written 
testimony in noting that “when officers line up in a military formation while 
wearing full protective gear, their visual appearance may have a dramatic 
influence on how the crowd perceives them and how the event ends.”236 
The second action item recommended that the federal government 
establish an enforcement mechanism “for investigating complaints and issuing 
sanctions regarding the inappropriate use of equipment and tactics during mass 
demonstrations.”237 Currently, the only realistic recourse for those whose 
constitutional rights have been violated by police during protests is to file a 
civil rights lawsuit.238 These are often beyond the means of protesters and they 
can take years to reach a settlement or verdict.239 Moreover, given that 
settlements are typically paid from municipal budgets, they tend not to impose 
any real costs on police departments and are therefore weak deterrents.240 
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Federal intervention could help hold police accountable for civil rights 
violations committed during protests and mass demonstrations.241 
The new vision of protest policing outlined in this section begins to flesh 
out how police agencies and those who regulate, fund, and train them can enact 
specific reforms consistent with the Task Force’s Recommendation 2.7.242 It is 
based on a framework developed by crowd psychologists who have worked 
closely with police forces throughout Europe to develop more thoughtful and 
effective public order policing strategies.243 The four elements in this 
framework are education, facilitation, communication, and differentiation.244 
Developing fairer and more effective approaches to protest policing means 
ensuring that these four elements are fully integrated into all relevant 
structures, policies, operational procedures, and training curricula.245 
A. Education 
As noted in Part III, crowds are often heterogeneous, composed of 
subgroups with distinct (though perhaps overlapping) social identities that 
influence the attitudes and behaviors of their members.246 Crowd psychologists 
emphasize that police must educate themselves about the social identities of 
these subgroups, including “their values and standards, aims and goals, their 
sense of what is right and proper, their stereotypes and expectations of other 
groups, their history of interaction with these groups,” and anything else of 
significance to them.247 Police often gather criminal intelligence on protesters 
with a history of violence or other criminal behavior, but it is much less 
common for police to gather information about the social identities of non-
criminal participants.248 In a study I conducted on the police response to the 
Occupy protests, one of the protesters we interviewed reinforced this idea, 
noting that “police know the hotheads; they should know their allies too.”249 
Police should learn as much as they can about influential moderates in a crowd 
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who may be able to help the police prevent or reduce conflict.250 
Understanding the nature and composition of a crowd will enable police to 
develop more nuanced protest policing strategies.251 
Many types of information may be useful for informing police about 
protesters and their intentions. The most important source of information is 
direct communication with protest leaders or organizers, which I address later 
in this section. Social media sites where protesters discuss their perspectives 
and intentions are another valuable source.252 More traditional criminal 
intelligence methods such as the use of undercover officers, informants, and 
various types of surveillance can also provide valuable information, though 
police must be careful in using them. 
In the absence of criminal conduct, collecting intelligence on otherwise 
lawful activities can raise constitutional issues and undermine community 
trust.253 Regardless of which sources are used, detailed information about the 
groups participating in an event can help provide police with a clearer sense of 
the most appropriate policing strategies.254 According to crowd psychologists, 
“by understanding the social identities of groups in the crowd, it is possible to 
know what the aims of the groups are, whether and how to support them, the 
forms of police action that might antagonize them and make them more 
sympathetic to violent elements in the crowd.”255 This information should play 
a key role in the selection of strategies and tactics that are more commensurate 
with the potential threat. 
Gathering information or seeking advice from other police agencies is 
another way police can prepare for protests and other public order events. For 
example, after three college students died in separate incidents associated with 
spontaneous sports celebrations from 2004-2008, the Boston Police 
Department (BPD) brought in police officials from Northern Ireland to help 
revise their crowd management and crowd control practices.256 While peer 
knowledge sharing can provide many benefits, there are two potential 
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limitations. First, bad practices can spread just as easily as good practices.257 
Larger agencies that do a terrible job of handling protests, including agencies 
whose bad decisions have resulted in costly civil settlements or verdicts, are 
often happy to advise other agencies on how to police protests and other 
events.258 
A common mistake is to confuse technical competence in riot control 
tactics with the much more challenging level of competence necessary to keep 
the peace while preserving people’s constitutional rights. Second, importing 
practices from other agencies in an uncritical way can result in the adoption of 
one-size-fits-all solutions that do not fit local circumstances and values. 
Although emulating agencies that are viewed as successful is common, much 
can also be learned from the mistakes made by others. For example, Chief 
Susan Riseling of the University of Wisconsin-Madison has written an 
insider’s account of the police response to protests at the Wisconsin State 
Capitol in 2011. Her candid discussion of mistakes made and lessons learned is 
a valuable resource for other police leaders.259 Another valuable resource are 
after-action reports written following demonstrations and other major events. 
The information in these reports can help police leaders think carefully about 
their own approaches to protest policing. 
B. Facilitation 
Police often view protests and mass demonstrations from the perspective 
of how to control or regulate them. This is understandable given that police are 
responsible for preserving public order and ensuring that such events remain 
peaceful and lawful. However, when protesters are exercising their First 
Amendment rights, the perception that police are exerting too much control 
can give the impression that police are simply trying to limit constitutionally 
protected behavior. As noted in Part III, perceptions of police fairness play an 
important role in shaping relationships between police and the public. This is 
especially true during protests and demonstrations because protesters tend to 
have “a heightened sense of grievance” that can easily be directed toward the 
police.260 The police can minimize this transfer of grievance by allowing 
protesters “a fair and reasonable chance to make their point peacefully.”261 By 
seeking to facilitate peaceful protests rather than only to control or regulate 
them, police can improve their relationships with protesters and reduce the 
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likelihood of conflict and violence.262 This becomes especially important when 
protests are focused on the police, since any perceived injustice will inevitably 
magnify the crowd’s concerns. 
Embracing the idea of facilitation will require police to rethink every 
aspect of the protest policing process. As crowd psychologists have explained: 
“An emphasis on facilitation needs to be paramount at all stages of the police 
operation. In planning for an event one needs to identify the legitimate aims of 
crowd members in order to consider how best to organize policing so as to 
enable them to be met. If there is some reason why they cannot be met in the 
way that organizers request it is essential not simply to give a negative 
response, but to be positive and creative in finding alternative ways of meeting 
(and being seen to meet) the underlying aims.”263 
It is a common belief in policing that if parts of a crowd become violent or 
destructive, then facilitation is no longer appropriate.264 To the contrary, this is 
precisely when facilitation becomes most essential. Under such circumstances, 
if it becomes necessary for police to make arrests or impose limits on the 
crowd, police should rely on the principles outlined in Part III, explaining what 
they are doing and why. Moreover, they should ensure that law-abiding and 
peaceful members of the crowd can continue to engage in legitimate forms of 
expression.265 As I will explain shortly, police should adopt a “differentiated” 
response that takes whatever actions are necessary to address those who are 
behaving in a violent or destructive manner, while continuing to facilitate the 
rights of peaceful protesters.266 Social psychologists caution that at this point, 
“a clear indication that the police are supporting collective aims (and that 
violence endangers them) can make the difference between escalation and de-
escalation.”267 
A commitment to facilitating lawful First Amendment expression will also 
require police to remain neutral even when they disagree with the content of 
that expression.268 Neutrality is the cornerstone of First Amendment case law, 
which allows police to assert reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions 
 
 262. See Reicher et al., supra note 188. 
 263. Reicher et al., supra note 188, at 567. 
 264. Reicher et al., supra note 188, at 567. 
 265. Reicher et al., supra note 188, at 567. 
 266. Reicher et al., supra note 188, at 567–69. 
 267. Reicher et al., supra note 188, at 567. 
 268. See Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content Neutrality Doctrine 
in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 649, 680 (2002) (Not all 
speech is protected by the First Amendment. Some examples of unprotected speech include 
threats, incitement, fighting words, and libel). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
102 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXV:67 
on protests, but these restrictions must be content neutral.269 In Texas v. 
Johnson, Justice William Brennan stated, “If there is a bedrock principle 
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the 
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”270 
Asking police officers to facilitate free speech that they find offensive may 
be challenging for police leaders, but it is an essential part of transforming 
police into “trusted guardians of democracy.”271 Another key aspect of 
facilitation is ensuring that police do not interfere with the work of journalists 
who are covering protests.272 Freedom of the press is enshrined in the First 
Amendment. Unfortunately, many journalists have been arrested or have had 
force used against them by police while covering protests.273 As noted in Part 
I, police harassment of journalists became a major issue in the Ferguson 
protests.274 
C. Communication 
Communication is an essential ingredient of community policing.275 
Effective communication between police and communities can help to 
establish goodwill, resolve crises, and prevent conflict.276 Communication is 
also an essential component of fair and effective protest policing.277 Although 
many types of internal and external communication are important, here I focus 
primarily on communication between police and protesters.278 Communication 
is an essential means by which police can learn about the aims of event 
organizers and how police can help facilitate these aims.279 It is also a useful 
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way for police to discover potential public safety issues and to work together 
with protest leaders to address these issues.280 
Communication between police and protesters can be very challenging. 
Protests are often highly decentralized and disorganized.281 Some protests 
emerge spontaneously and therefore don’t have clear leadership or direction. 
Others, like the Occupy movement, reject the idea of leadership and hierarchy 
out of principle.282 Many protests are loud and chaotic and take on a life of 
their own, thus whenever possible, police should communicate with protesters 
long before the actual protest. 
Communication between police and protesters is especially difficult when 
the two parties have a history of conflict. Social psychologists note that in such 
instances, “the very attempt to tell crowd members how policing is designed to 
facilitate them may be seen as dishonest and actually exacerbate hostility.”283 
These challenges are intensified when protests are focused on the police. 
Protesters may try to goad the police into mistreating them to prove a point or 
to provide grounds for a lawsuit. It is especially important in moments like this 
to alter the interpersonal dynamic in order to prevent conflict or violence. 
Communicating patiently and professionally with people who are angry or 
frustrated with you or the institution you represent can go a long way toward 
de-escalating conflict. 
Some police agencies assign officers to stand in a rigid, formal manner in a 
fixed position or skirmish line during protests, without engaging in dialogue 
with protesters.284 Sometimes skirmish lines are necessary to contain a riotous 
crowd. However, as noted in a report by the Berkeley police, “skirmish lines 
should be deployed judiciously and only in those situations where the 
reasonable use of force that may be necessary to enforce the line and protect 
officers is warranted by the objective of deploying the line.”285 A better 
approach is to encourage officers to interact with crowds in a friendly manner 
whenever possible. This humanizes the police, enabling protesters to see the 
person behind the badge. While officers should not take sides or get involved 
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in debating the issues under protest, open communication between police and 
protesters is useful for establishing trust and preventing conflict. When police 
communicate with protesters calmly and respectfully, it can help to encourage 
cooperation with police. This is the approach used by the “Dialogue Police” in 
Sweden, where officers mingle with crowds and rely on ongoing dialogue to 
build trust and reduce conflict.286 
Consistent with the notion of community policing, forming partnerships 
with key stakeholders can also provide many benefits.287 Thinking of protest 
organizers and participants as allies rather than enemies can make the job of 
police much easier. As noted in Part III, an important part of policing protests 
successfully is behaving in ways that encourage protest groups to regulate the 
behavior of their own members.288 This can only be accomplished through 
effective communication between protesters and police. Another way for 
police to enhance their perceived legitimacy during protests is to develop 
strong partnerships with the media. After the 2009 G-20 Summit in London, 
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of the Constabulary noted that police must 
“develop more effective media communication strategies… It is no longer an 
option for the police not to include the media in briefings before, during and 
after large scale public order events.”289 
D. Differentiation 
The discussion of crowd psychology in Part III outlined the perils of 
treating a crowd as homogeneous and taking action against the whole crowd 
based on the misbehavior of certain individuals.290 Treating moderate members 
of a crowd who are engaged in lawful behavior as criminal can inadvertently 
encourage them to align with more radical members against the police. When 
police behave in ways that moderates perceive as unjust or overly aggressive, 
police may do more harm than good. Whenever possible, police should rely on 
a differentiated response by continuing to facilitate peaceful and lawful 
behavior even when taking enforcement action against lawbreakers.291 
Consistent with the research evidence presented in Part III, this approach is 
intended to preserve the perceived legitimacy of the police and reduce the 
likelihood of widespread defiance or rebellion.292 
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Developing a differentiated response strategy that is consistent with the 
research evidence presented in Part III means reconsidering three factors. First, 
whenever possible, arrests should be made sparingly. Mass arrests are often 
unnecessary and can result in costly civil rights lawsuits.293 Second, police 
should only use force against protesters as a last resort when alternative 
measures have failed. Police sometimes use officer safety concerns as a 
justification to use force against protesters. Ironically, the indiscriminate use of 
force by police may place officers at greater risk by increasing the number of 
angry people who view the use of violence against police as justifiable.294 
Third, the use of overly restrictive crowd containment methods may impose an 
unnecessary burden on peaceful protesters, thus encouraging an atmosphere of 
defiance and rebellion against police. The use of “kettling” – in which crowds 
are detained for long periods within police cordons, often without access to 
food, water, or bathrooms – endangers protesters (and in some cases, innocent 
bystanders) and is a recipe for conflict. Indiscriminate crowd containment 
measures also result in costly civil rights lawsuits.295 A differentiated response 
strategy seeks to ensure that police actions only impose a burden on those who 
are breaking the law.296 
Crowd psychologists emphasize that differentiation cannot simply be 
tacked on to existing policing strategies.297 Instead, it must be “built into every 
tactical or strategic decision, into training, planning, equipping, briefing, and 
operating in crowds.”298 A differentiated police response focuses enforcement 
action on those in a crowd whose illegal behavior is endangering public 
safety.299 Meanwhile, police continue facilitating the lawful and peaceful 
behavior of other crowd members. A challenge that arises in encouraging 
police to implement more differentiated response strategies is a concern with 
officer safety.300 Asking police officers to enter crowds without protective gear 
raises questions about how officers will protect themselves if the crowd turns 
unruly. One solution is to adopt a graded response plan for events in which 
crowd violence is thought to be a possibility.301 In a graded response, tactical 
assets are staged nearby but out of sight and can be deployed rapidly if 
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needed.302 If they are visible to the crowd, instead of enhancing officer safety, 
they may place officers at greater risk by escalating matters.303 
In my study of the police response to the Occupy protests, police officials 
from several agencies acknowledged the problems with deploying officers in 
riot gear.304 In Madison, for example, one official stated that when officers 
wear riot gear, “it incites a type of reaction that might backfire and agitate.”305 
In Charlotte, an official said “once the hats and bats and turtle suits come out, 
it brings aggression with it.”306 In Cleveland, an official said wearing riot gear 
“sets the tone in a bad way and scares people.”307 Another official from 
Cleveland noted that “police must set the tone for civility, not 
confrontation.”308 Former police chief Chris Burbank from Salt Lake City told 
us that “if you line up a bunch of police officers with riot gear and shields, you 
are telling protesters ‘to go ahead and throw rocks and bottles at us’.”309 While 
riot gear is essential in certain circumstances, using it prematurely can trigger 
unanticipated consequences. 
The use of a graded, differentiated response can be challenging when 
multiple agencies are involved in policing an event.310 Mutual aid from other 
police agencies raises many complex issues, including interagency differences 
in how to handle protests.311 These may result from explicit differences in 
protest policing strategy, but more often they result from differences in training 
or experience.312 Mutual aid agreements must ensure that agencies rely on 
similar strategies and tactics. This can be very challenging, particularly for 
spontaneous events or those that involve a large area or number of 
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participants.313 For example, during the protests that erupted in and around 
Ferguson in August 2014, more than 50 police agencies responded, resulting in 
what has been described as “a mishmash of tactics and confusion.”314 
The use of a graded, differentiated response strategy can be difficult for 
officers working on the front lines of a protest.315 Unfortunately, some 
protesters choose to taunt officers, trying to goad them into responding 
inappropriately. Officers may also fear for their safety, particularly when 
wearing soft uniforms. For many officers, the combination of stress, fear, and 
fatigue can make it very challenging to police protests. At events in which 
officers are being taunted or where there is a threat of violence, officers should 
be rotated out periodically to have a break before resuming their duties. Good 
supervisors will pay attention to signs of emotional or physical distress among 
officers and relieve these officers as needed. Officers should also be trained to 
pay attention to these same issues in themselves and their peers and to respond 
as needed to prevent conflict or other issues. 
CONCLUSION 
The four principles we have articulated in this article – education, 
facilitation, communication, and differentiation – form the basis for a new 
vision of protest policing in the U.S. Unfortunately, some police agencies still 
handle protests much as they did in the 1960s. Moreover, some agencies do not 
seem to be dissuaded by costly civil settlements that result from a pattern of 
abusive and unconstitutional practices that violate the civil rights of protesters, 
journalists, and bystanders. Yet, my study of the police response to the Occupy 
movement revealed numerous instances of police leaders developing 
thoughtful, fair, and effective approaches to policing protests. 
Research on compliance, defiance, and crowd behavior provides a useful 
foundation for developing thoughtful policing strategies for handling protests. 
The goal is to implement strategies that encourage the crowd to regulate itself, 
thus reducing some of the burden on police. According to crowd psychologists, 
one good way to accomplish this goal is: 
“…to place a major emphasis on how to be supportive towards crowd 
members pursuing legal goals and activities, even under conditions where one 
is aware of the presence of groups with illegal goals and even at points where 
these groups start to act in illegal or violent ways. Such an emphasis makes it 
more likely that crowd members will, at best, suppress violence their midst. At 
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worse, one can expect members to isolate people acting violent and accept 
police action against violent groups should it prove necessary.”316 
Through the use of strategies that incorporate the basic principles outlined in 
this section – education, facilitation, communication, and differentiation – 
police agencies can deal with people who are breaking the law while upholding 
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